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Abstract 
 
While the root causes of terrorism are multidimensional – ranging from religious extremism to a sense of 
alienation from society to anger at perceived geopolitical injustice – economic factors can help explain the 
rise of terrorism. With the help of the ARDL bounds testing approach followed by variance decomposition 
(VDC) and impulse response (IR) function, this study provides an empirical investigation to determine the 
causal relationship of the variables of economic growth, trade, military spending, education spending and 
unemployment on the onslaught of terrorism in Pakistan. The results of the overall study clearly conform to 
the deprivation and modernization hypotheses that underdevelopment and poverty do provide fertile grounds 
to terrorists for new recruits while unequal growth could equally facilitate the spread of terrorism. According 
to our analysis, in the short run, terrorism is most affected by the variables of trade and GDP. However, in 
the long-run, two startling outcomes are the positive and significant relationships between GDP growth and 
terrorism, and also between military spending and terrorism which imply that increased economic growth 
and military spending breed terrorism. The first relationship can be explained on the basis of rising income 
inequality and modernization hypothesis. The second linkage can be the aftermath of government’s 
asymmetric military spending at the expense of critical development sectors like education which 
significantly reduce the opportunity cost of terrorism in the society as elicited by a significant long-run 
relationship between military spending and education. The overall result of the study has many significant 
policy implications including shifting the precedence of military spending and war on terror towards the 
more desirable socio-economic sectors of education, trade and employment. 
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An empirical investigation of causal linkages between domestic terrorism and macroeconomic 
variables: a case for Pakistan 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
 
Terrorism is often viewed in historical, sociological, psychological, political, or geopolitical terms alone but 
it can also have substantial economic repercussions. Catastrophic terrorist attacks such as 9/11 can impair 
business and consumer conﬁdence, which hinders investment and consumption patterns and through it the 
relevant macroeconomic performance. Terrorist attacks that target vital infrastructure can seriously disrupt 
transportation and communication networks and thus could cripple the entire economy. Indeed, some terrorist 
attacks are specifically designed to inﬂict economic damage upon the target country. In addition, the war on 
terrorism can have a substantial economic effect on both the country waging the war – such as the US – and 
the home country—such as Afghanistan – or on proxy states like Pakistan. For the US, the massive military 
spending incurred during the war has signiﬁcant implications for its ﬁscal health. For Afghanistan, a low 
income country with limited resources, the military spending of the US and its coalition partners was, in 
effect, a huge boost in foreign aid, with a correspondingly outsized impact on economic growth. Terrorism 
not only has economic consequences, but also economic causes. There is a multitude of situations capable of 
provoking terrorism. Discussions about the causes and consequences of terrorism are bound to be 
controversial. To many people, any focus on underlying causes, motivating factors, and grievances, implies 
a kind of justification for violence. While such objections may in some cases be plausible but any academic 
study focusing on the origins and repercussions of terrorism must objectively rely upon causalities and 
dispassionately explore all significant factors leading to changes in its occurrence and manifestation. 
Furthermore, in the post 9/11 era, it is more important than ever that one seeks to understand the driving 
forces and motivations behind terrorism; otherwise it will be impossible to devise balanced and effective 
long-term counter-measures.  
 
Some argue that poverty, unemployment, trade and many other economic factors have little explanatory 
power on the onset of terrorism. Others argue that terrorist attacks can have significant negative effects on 
economic performance but measuring this impact with any degree of certainty is inherently challenging. 
There is a wide range of factors which may give rise to terrorism, economic factors are generally believed to 
play a crucial role. The long term indirect costs of terrorism can be 10 to 20 times larger than the direct costs 
(Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). With the threat of terrorism, normal business requires more time 
and extra security. Thus, terrorism leads to a general slowdown and friction in economic activity. 
Modernization, based on free trade and an open economy, will foster a high level of economic development, 
which in itself lowers the potential for violent conflict. A prosperous, developed economy will also lay the 
ground for democratic rule, which again, together with a high level of economic development, has a 
stabilizing effect on internal affairs and ultimately promotes domestic peace. It also promotes international 
peace as democracies very rarely fight other democracies. In short, the liberal school’s view is that 
modernization leads to prosperity, which in turn, reduces the chances of violent conflict, either directly or 
via political reform and democratization. 
 
While the root causes of terrorism are multidimensional – ranging from religious extremism to a sense of 
alienation from society to anger at perceived geopolitical injustice – economic factors can help explain the 
rise of terrorism. Economic stagnation can limit employment and other economic opportunities for the youth. 
Lack of economic opportunities can be a powerful driver of terrorism, especially in conjunction with other 
problematic social and political factors. This problem is especially pronounced in countries with relatively 
young populations and large numbers of young people. A large and growing army of young people mired in 
hopelessness and despair about the future provide fertile recruiting grounds for terrorist organizations. 
Terrorists may be deprived and uneducated people or affluent and well educated. There exist few, if any, 
  
comprehensive reviews of academic works explaining why some countries experience more terrorism than 
others. This is evidently a knowledge gap that needs to be addressed. The societal or national level is 
considered the most useful level of analysis with regards to any attempts at forecasting and long-term 
prediction about domestic terrorism trends. 
A significant proportion of terrorist activities is limited to very few geographical pockets across the globe 
which are typically characterized by poverty and poor economic progress. The majority of deaths from 
terrorism do not occur in the West. Excluding the September 11 attack, only 0.5 per cent of deaths from 
terrorism have occurred in the West since 2000. Including September 11, the percentage reaches 2.6. Since 
2000 there has been over a ﬁve-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism, rising from 3,361 in 
2000 to 17,958 in 2013 and over 80 per cent of the lives lost to terrorist activity in 2013 occurred in only ﬁve 
countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria - and Pakistan is on rank three according to Global 
Terrorism Index Report 2013 (See figure 1) 
 
The burden on a state actively fighting terrorism may be enormous, serious and at times unmanageable, with 
severe consequences on the country’s economic outlook. Pakistan’s economic growth (as measured by GDP) 
came to a near halt at around 2 per cent in the fiscal year 2009, not alone of the global financial crisis, but 
primarily because of internal security issues. These included military operations aimed at terrorists launched 
by Pakistan Army in the northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administrated Tribal 
Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan which lead to a mass exodus of some three million people local 
population to other areas of Pakistan in search of a sanctuary – turning it into an unprecedented social crisis.   
Figure 1: Summary of statistics about terrorism in Pakistan 
 
 
(Source: The Global Terrorism Index 2013, published by the Institute for Economics and Peace) 
 
The burden on a state actively fighting terrorism may be enormous, serious and at times unmanageable, with 
severe consequences on the country’s economic outlook. Pakistan’s economic growth (as measured by GDP) 
  
came to a near halt at around 2 per cent in the fiscal year 2009, not alone of the global financial crisis, but 
primarily because of internal security issues. These included military operations aimed at terrorists launched 
by Pakistan Army in the northern province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administrated Tribal 
Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan which lead to a mass exodus of some three million people local 
population to other areas of Pakistan in search of a sanctuary – turning it into an unprecedented social crisis.   
Both the ‘war on terror’ and the rehabilitation of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) consumed a big 
chunk of the government’s financial resources, thus widening the fiscal deficit and stagnating economic 
growth. Pakistan has suffered more than any other country due to the war on terror. Moreover, the terrorists 
have challenged the writ of the government by creating chaos and uncertain conditions that have tarnished 
the soft image of Pakistan. Experts of international economics hold that the soft image of a state is like a 
cashable commodity, as it is an important source for attracting foreign direct investments (FDI). Pakistan’s 
declining FDI trend over the 5 year period (2010-2015) of heightened escalation of terrorist activities is self-
explanatory in the table given below. The frequent incidents of terrorism have given a bad name to Pakistan 
in the comity of nations and international markets, which has damaged the economy, polity and society of 
Pakistan, on multiple levels3. 
Figure 2: Summary statistics of Pakistan foreign direct investment 
 
Academic literature focusing on the causes and development of terrorism has mainly dealt with the effects 
of political and institutional factors on terrorism (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011; Krieger & Meierrieks, 
2011). These mostly transnational studies have shown that political and institutional factors have historically 
played a more important and influential role in the growth of terrorism than that of economic factors. 
Although, previous studies resorted to taking a more transnational approach but this study opts for a country-
specific approach by focusing specifically on Pakistan. (Sánchez-Cuenca & De la Calle, 2009) conclude that 
studies focusing on transnational terrorism may bring about incorrect assumptions pertaining domestic or 
country-specific acts of terrorism. Therefore probing the economic determinants of growth and development 
of terrorism in Pakistan should essentially be approached through a country-specific model to yield better 
understanding instead of the traditional transnational approach as seen in (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011; 
Krieger & Meierrieks, 2011; Piazza, 2006). 
 
There has been a visible dearth of literature discussing the economics of terrorism in developing countries 
like Pakistan. Moreover, previous studies haven’t rigorously discussed the trade-off between acquisition of 
‘hard power’ vs socio-economic development as a determinant of growth of terrorism in a country. 
Asymmetries in military expenditure and development initiatives by a state are often followed by dismal 
                                                          
3 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). Global Terrorism Database [Data 
file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
  
socio-economic conditions which provide fertile ground for terrorism. This is especially relevant for 
Pakistan, which has been consistently criticised for its nuclear program development at the cost of its socio-
economic infrastructure. It is thus imperative for any meaningful study on terrorism in Pakistan to probe, in 
addition to the effect of economic growth, the effect of the ‘hard power’ vs socio-economic development 
choice made by a state as reflected by its military expenditure on one side and its development indicators 
like education expenditure, unemployment rate and trade as percentage of GDP on the other side. Therefore, 
the main objective of this paper is to determine the causal relationship of the variables of economic progress, 
military expenditure, education expenditure, unemployment rate and trade on the onslaught of terrorism in a 
country. Moreover, the study also seeks to establish the relative endogeneity and exogeneity of these 
variables to make the analysis useful and relevant for drawing policy implications i.e. what variables actually 
need to be influenced to achieve the desired counter-terrorism results. Relevant literature has usually taken 
the number of terrorism incidents in a year as proxy for terrorism in a country but for the first time for 
Pakistan this study would be taking number of terrorism related fatalities and injuries as proxy for terrorism, 
which is more representative of the extent of damage done by terrorists relative to mere number of incidents.  
With the help of the ARDL bounds testing approach followed by variance decomposition (VDC) and impulse 
response (IR) analyses, this study provides empirical investigation the economic causes of terrorism in 
Pakistan and suggests certain effective counterterrorism policies.  
 
The results of the overall study clearly conform our deprivation and modernization hypotheses that 
underdevelopment and poverty do provide fertile grounds to terrorists for new recruits. A surprising outcome 
of our results is a positive and significant relationship between military spending and terrorism. According 
to our analysis in the short run terrorism is most effected by the trade and GDP growth and in the long run 
Terrorism elicits a significant relationship with military spending and education which has significant policy 
implications.  The study also reveals the fact that military spending is the only exogenous variable that can 
be used as a policy instrument with a balancing approach as military spending has the most significant 
influence on the education spending which in turn is directly linked with unemployment, GDP growth and 
trade and therefore leads towards terrorism. Our analysis should give policymakers at least some rough clues 
about what is at stake economically in the event of a terrorist attack. 
 
The next section will discuss the historical narrative of the onslaught of terrorism in Pakistan to set the context 
straight. The third section covers the review of literature while the fourth section explains the data and 
methodology used. The fifth section then presents the empirical results and discussion while suggesting 
policy implications based on empirical results obtained in section 4. Conclusions and avenues for future 
research are discussed in Section 6. 
 
Section 2: An overview of terrorism in Pakistan: 
Pakistan has throughout been a victim of its geopolitical situation and geostrategic location. On one side, 
there is the long running Kashmir dispute with India and on the other side, the porous border with Afghanistan 
is not secure and is prone to infiltration by Islamic militants such as the Taliban. Although, Pakistan has been 
suffering from the terrorism problem ever since its creation in 1947 but historically there are five defining 
events or factors that triggered or accelerated the growth of organized terrorism in Pakistan.  
The first of these was the rise to power of General Zia-Ul-Haq, a military dictator who arrested the then 
elected Prime Minster Mr. Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto and subsequently executed him in 1979. As a result of 
Bhutto’s execution, a terrorist group called Al-Zulfikar emerged to seek revenge. To counter Al-Zulfikar, 
General Zia created and nurtured a new political group called Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM), which 
banked on the politics of ethnicity. In its heyday, MQM may have been responsible for 90% of terrorist 
incidents in the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad, and 40% in the rest of the country (Fair, 2004).  
 
  
The second wave of terrorism was generated in the aftermath of the Iranian revolution of 1979. Before 1980s, 
religion was not considered a major fissure in Pakistani society but the Shia-Sunni sectarian divide intensified 
ever since the Iranian revolution, which gave rise to the phenomenon of religious terrorism and extremism 
in Pakistan.  
Third and probably the most significant event was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, due to which, 
US funded Islamic militants from different regions of the world came to Pakistan to move across the border 
to fight against the Russian occupation. Those militants subsequently became the foundation of terrorism in 
Pakistan, especially in the northern part of the country. In fact, they became the epicenter of global terrorism 
for decades to come (Weiner, 1998).  
The fourth wave ensued from the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as the political control of 
Afghanistan fell into the hands of Taliban. The Americans formerly supported Islamic militants in the 
northern part of Pakistan and Afghanistan during the fight against Soviet occupation while some of these 
militants, in the likes of Osama Bin Laden, went on to become some of the most feared terrorists in the world.   
The fifth event was the game-changing 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. The attacks elevated global terrorism 
to an entirely different level and provoked US-led military strikes against Afghanistan and the fall of the 
Taliban regime there. Pakistan provided crucial logistic support to US in its offensive against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. One by-product of the US invasion of Afghanistan was the spillover of Islamic militancy and 
terrorism to the bordering areas of Pakistan as the militants fled to Pakistan to avoid US strikes, made possible 
by a porous border between the two countries.   
Pakistan has suffered a lot due to terrorism in terms of both security and economy, enduring more than 56,000 
deaths and more than 40,000 injuries. Additionally, large scores of people have been internally displaced and 
forced to migrate to other parts of the country. Terrorism destroyed a lot of infrastructure, worsened the 
investment climate, affected production, and increased unemployment. Due to heightened risk and 
uncertainty, domestic and foreign investment stalled, and economic growth slowed down. During the last 
decade, the total cost of terrorism (direct & indirect) for Pakistan is estimated to be around in excess of US 
$ 103 billon which is equivalent to Rs.8260 billion (Estrada et al., 2015). Government of Pakistan has been 
actively fighting terrorism for the past decade, via Pakistan Army and supported by U.S. military forces 
(logistics and financial support). In particular, the massacre of 148 innocent school children in a public school 
of Peshawar in December 2014 was a structural break in the government’s attitude and policies on terrorism 
issues. This act of brutality lead to the development of a comprehensive ‘national action plan’ (NAP) by the 
Government to eradicate terrorism (Javaid, 2015). 
 
Section 3: Review of literature 
There has been extensive literature pertaining to terrorism, most of which is written after 1968. However, 
much of this work either falls into the trap of being ideologically biased while being purely psychological 
and speculative, or is built on data of dubious quality. Furthermore, bulk of this research deals with 
conceptual or definitional problems, and only limited effort is put into systematic, empirical work. Thus, 
most of the existing literature suffers from a general lack of good empirically grounded research on the 
patterns and causes of terrorism. However, over the past few years, there has been some progress in terrorism 
research testing hypotheses about the causes of terrorism and new research has demonstrated causal 
relationships between prevalent socio-economic and political conditions and incidence of terrorism (Silke, 
2004).  
There are two major schools of thought on the economic explanations of roots of terrorism. The first and 
most popular school holds that it is poor economic conditions and lack of economic growth that favors the 
emergence of terrorism and political violence. They argue that poverty and income inequality would feed 
frustration, hatred and grievance which makes political violence and hence terrorism more likely. In the 
presence of widespread poverty, the opportunity cost for individuals of joining terrorist ranks is very low and 
this favors the recruitment process undertaken by terrorist organizations. This point (which is based on the 
  
classical opportunity-cost argument) is commonly known as economic deprivation hypothesis. The second 
school holds that even an unequal stream of economic growth can fuel the grievances of some groups in the 
society owing to economic disparity, which would increase the propensity for violence and through it of 
terrorism. This is known as the modernization hypothesis and the basic intuition of this argument is that 
socio-economic changes over long-run affect socio-economic conditions. In this view, terrorist organizations 
would flourish if they are able to collect and capitalize on the grievances of losers. Therefore, terrorism and 
political violence would emerge in the presence of economic growth and development. It might seem 
counter-intuitive that economic growth may fuel terrorism but studies performed by (Lai & Thyne, 2007), 
(Freytag & Thurik, 2010), (Caruso & Schneider, 2011)and (Ismail & Amjad, 2014) revealed results in 
conformity with the modernization hypothesis. 
 
As for its impact on domestic or intra-state terrorism, (Engene, 1998) finds that rapid economic 
modernization, measured in growth in real GDP4, has a strong, significant impact on levels of ideological 
terrorism in Western Europe. However, relevant literature does not provide a conclusive answer on any 
bidirectional causal linkage between terrorism and economic growth. In hindsight, an increase in economic 
growth rate should lead to a decline in terrorism by increasing the opportunity costs of engaging in terrorist 
activities (deprivation argument). However, on the other hand, if the benefits of economic growth are not 
widespread and there is an unequal distribution of wealth, geographically or otherwise, it may cause domestic 
terrorism to rise (modernization argument). Alternatively, an increase in terrorist activities may lead to a 
decline in economic growth. It is also possible that causality exists from both sides or there may be no 
causality at all between economic growth and terrorism (Muhammad et al., 2011). 
 
One of the most robust findings in quantitative peace research is that most violent conflicts occur within or 
between poor or underdeveloped countries, while hardly ever in rich developed states (Gleditsch, 2002). 
Also, cross-country studies surveying attitudes and norms, find that the level of wealth and economic 
development is highly significant in accounting for variations in support for political violence (MacCulloch, 
2004). Using micro-data sets based on opinion polls and value/attitude surveys from more than 60 countries 
from 1975-1995, (MacCulloch, 2004) finds that popular support for revolutions varies greatly with general 
income level of the people and a rise in GDP significantly reduces the chances of supporting a revolt5. A 
more direct explanation of how poverty promotes violence is the so-called ‘predation theory’ by (Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2004). They argue that in any society there will always be greed-motivated conflict entrepreneurs 
willing to take up arms against a government as long as it is financially viable to do so. In societies where 
the level of welfare is high, the costs of participating in insurrections are much higher than in poor societies, 
higher economic incentives are needed, and hence, growing welfare radically reduces the economic viability 
of an armed revolt. Conversely, where poverty is extreme and widespread, little economic incentive is needed 
to motivate young people to risk their lives as guerrillas, if only for the monetary compensations involved 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004).  
 
After the 9/11 incident, the debate about whether poverty facilitates terrorism has gained considerable 
momentum (Krueger & Malečková, 2003). (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004; Frey et al., 2007; Mirza & Verdier, 
2008; Sandler & Enders, 2008) have discussed the theoretical framework regarding channels through which 
terrorism impedes economic growth. The potential costs of terrorism borne by an economy, in terms of 
hampered economic growth, can be classified as direct and indirect costs. (Collier, 1999) identified the most 
obvious and direct perils of civil wars, of which terrorism can be considered a related phenomenon, as 
destruction of physical capital including the destruction of public infrastructure and the loss of human capital. 
                                                          
4 Economic growth in real GDP is frequently used as an indicator of economic modernisation in research on conflict and violence.  
5 MacCulloch (2204) has used The European Commission’s Euro-Barometer Survey Series for 1976-1990 and The Combined 
World Values Survey for 1981, 1990, 1995, produced by the Institute for Social Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA.  
  
Simultaneously, transaction costs are amplified as a result of the reduced security and the effectiveness of 
government institutions is compromised. A key factor affecting economic growth and through it the 
incidence of terrorism is the share of GDP directed toward development spending by the state, which boils 
down to the ‘hard power’ vs development tradeoff mentioned earlier. (Blomberg et al., 2004; Gaibulloev & 
Sandler, 2008) highlight that terrorism diverges economic activities away from development spending to 
non-productive defense spending to counter and deter terrorist activities. (Knight et al., 1996) quantified the 
impact of military spending on gross domestic product (GDP) and showed that an additional 2.2% of GDP 
spent on the military, sustained over seven years (the length of a typical conflict) would lead to a permanent 
loss of around 2% of GDP.  
 
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008) showed that significant reductions exist in net foreign investment flows into 
a country due to terrorist risk. (Enders & Sandler, 1996) investigated the impact of terrorism on the net 
foreign direct investment (NFDI) in Spain and Greece using VAR analysis. They found that terrorism 
reduced foreign direct investment flows by 13.5% and 11.9% in these countries respectively as investors 
sought out less violence-prone countries; however the impact is expected to be smaller for larger diversified 
economies. In addition, (Coe & Helpman, 1995) identified that foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a vital 
role in technology transfer which enhances total factor productivity leading away the economy away from 
violent tendencies. Moreover, terrorism can adversely disrupt financial markets, thereby decreasing 
investment flows (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). 
 
A quantitative cross-country study by (Li & Schaub, 2004) reveals that economic development in a country 
and among its major trading partners reduces the likelihood of transnational terrorism. They conclude that 
the effect of economic development in reducing transnational terrorism is significant and recommend that: 
‘promoting economic development and reducing poverty should be an important component in the global 
war against terrorism’. (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Chen & Siems, 2004; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008; 
Sandler & Enders, 2008) have shown that economic growth is negatively affected by terrorism albeit to 
different levels in different economies. (Mirza & Verdier, 2008; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004) have also 
documented the negative impact of terrorism in a country on its bilateral international trade. According to 
their study Pakistan faces a humongous loss of revenue that could have had otherwise been generated from 
serving as a trade route between India, China, Iran and other Central Asian states which is currently not 
possible due to massive terrorist activities in the bordering areas of Pakistan. 
 
(Ismail & Amjad, 2014) examined the determinants of terrorism in Pakistan. They used time series data of 
terrorist incidents as proxy for terrorism for the period 1972 to 2011. The other variables of the study are 
GDP per capita, political rights, literacy, inflation, unemployment, inflation, poverty, and inequality. They 
concluded long run relationships among the various economic and social variables with literacy, poverty, 
inflation, and GDP per capita standing out as the most important determinants of terrorism in Pakistan while 
political repression, unemployment, and inequality were found to be insignificant towards incidence of 
terrorism. (Hussain, 2003) studied causes and origin of terrorism in Pakistan from an economic history 
perspective and concluded illiteracy and poverty to be the prime determinants of terrorism and societal 
intolerance in Pakistan. 
 
However, the recent Global Terrorism Index Report 20156 reveals that poverty and several other economic 
factors have little explanatory power on the onset of terrorism. This includes several broader development 
                                                          
6 National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2015). Global Terrorism Database [Data 
file]. Retrieved from http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd 
  
factors such as mean years of schooling and life expectancy, etc. It highlights that weak political systems, a 
lack of political legitimacy and the presence of state-sponsored violence are more inﬂuential for explaining 
the rise of terrorist organizations than the broader economic environment. (Gassebner & Luechinger, 2011) 
also found that economic development had a minor effect on terrorist activities. (Piazza, 2006) evaluated the 
deprivation hypothesis that poverty, inequality, poor economic development, and unemployment are the 
prime causes of terrorism. However, the results did not indicate any causality between economic growth and 
terrorism. Instead the structure of party politics was found to be the most significant predictor of terrorism. 
Here it is important to note that most of these inferences of little or no economic rationale for terrorism are 
generally broad transnational models for different factors relating to terrorist activities. Similarly, (Derin‐
Güre, 2011) scrutinized the causes of separatist terrorism in South-Eastern parts of Turkey where government 
policies are geared toward improving economic conditions in pursuance of the widely accepted hypothesis 
that poverty is the main driving force behind separatist terrorism. However, there was no causal relationship 
found between economic development and separatist terrorism in South-Eastern Turkey. (Nasir et al., 2008) 
studied the direction of causal relationship between economic growth and terrorism in Pakistan and found 
no causality running either from economic growth to terrorism or from terrorism to economic growth. 
 
The main proposition of this study is that terrorist activities cause poor economic performance when analyzed 
within the scope of domestic terrorism. The adverse effects of terrorism on economy can be best explained 
by the rational choice theory. A government under the threat of terrorist attacks has to fight terrorism on a 
rational basis. Government, thus, needs to spend on military at the cost of compromising the crucial sectors 
of economy like education, employment and trade etc. which is perceived to be less detrimental than giving 
into the demands of terrorists (Sandler & Enders, 2008). Thus, the motivation of this study is to extend the 
literature by making a Pakistan specific analysis of the economic variables of GDP per capita, military 
spending, education spending, unemployment, trade and terrorism to draw any long-run and short-run 
relationships amongst these variables. 
 
Section 4: Data and Methodology  
4.1: The Data 
The data for terrorism is retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), maintained by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). Deﬁning terrorism is not a 
straight forward matter and there is no single internationally accepted deﬁnition of what constitutes terrorism, 
and literature on terrorism is abound with competing deﬁnitions and typologies. The GTI therefore deﬁnes 
terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, 
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” Domestic terrorism is indicated 
by the total number of individuals killed and wounded by the acts of domestic terrorism in a given year and 
added unity to allow for zero observations.7  
 
We extract the data for all other economic variables from the World Development Indicators8 database 
maintained by the World Bank. Economic growth is measured by the real GDP per capita. We transformed 
both the series of terrorism and GDP by taking the natural logarithm to better account for the outliers and to 
turn the series stationary in variance.  Government expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP, military 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP, unemployment as a percentage of total labour force and trade (sum of 
                                                          
7 We add unity to the observations in order to compute the natural logarithm also in those years when there were no victims 
from terrorist attacks. Note that by adequate data processing we circumvent potential problems associated with ‘excess zeros’ 
(i.e., when there are many observations without victims from terrorism). 
8 The World Bank. 2015. "World Development Indicators." URL: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-
indicators 
  
imports and exports of goods and services in a year) as a percentage of GDP are the other economic variables 
considered in the study. The data used here are the yearly figures and covers a span of 45 years starting from 
1970 to 2014.  
 
4.2 The Methodology 
The Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model or simply the ARDL bound testing approach to cointegration 
developed by (Pesaran et al., 2001) has been used to conduct cointegration analysis between terrorism, 
economic growth, education spending, military spending and  total trade for the case of Pakistan. The ARDL 
bound testing approach to cointegration is preferred over traditional cointegration approaches due to its 
merits. For instance, the ARDL bounds testing can be applied regardless of whether the variables are 
integrated of order I(0) or integrated of order I(1). The ARDL bound testing approach to cointegration has 
better properties for small data sample. (Zhang & Yue, 2002) has shown that the ARDL approach to 
cointegration provides better results for a small sample data set as compared to traditional approaches such 
as the (Engle & Granger, 1987); the (Johansen & Juselius, 1990); and (Phillips & Hansen, 1990) methods. 
These approaches require that all the series should have unique order of integration. In addition, unrestricted 
error correction model (UECM) is derived from the ARDL model using simple linear specification (Banerjee 
& Newman, 1993), which integrates both long-run as well as short-run dynamics. The UECM model does 
not seem to lose information about long-run relation. Another advantage of the ARDL bound testing 
approach is that the unrestricted model of ECM accommodates lags that capture the data generating process 
in a general-to-specific framework (Laurenceson & Chai, 2003). This method is favored over the traditional 
regression method because the Regression only Approach only captures short term, cyclical or seasonal 
effects. In other words, the regression is not really testing long term (theoretical) relationships. Moreover, in 
traditional regression, the endogeneity and exogeneity of variables is pre-determined by the researcher, 
usually on the basis of prevailing or a priori theories. However, in case of terrorism and its related studies, 
we are dealing with a relatively nascent subject and there is a notable absence of established theories. 
Cointegration techniques are advantageous in that they do not presume variable endogeneity and exogeneity. 
In the final analysis, the data will determine which variables are in fact exogenous, and which are exogenous. 
In other words, with regression, causality is presumed whereas in cointegration, it is empirically proven with 
the data. Also, cointegration techniques embrace the dynamic interaction between variables whereas 
traditional regression methods, by definition, exclude or discriminate against interaction between variables. 
 
The unrestricted error correction model (UECM) of the ARDL bound testing approach to cointegration 
version is as follows: 
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Where T is the trend variable, GDP per capita is the proxy for economic growth represented by GDPPC, 
TERROR is a proxy for number of fatalities and injured representing terrorism, TRADE represents the trade 
as a percentage of GDP, EDU represents the education spending as a percentage of GDP, Military is a proxy 
for military expenditures as a percentage of GDP and UNEMP is the proxy for unemployment as percentage 
of total labor force.  
In order to ensure that serial correlation does not exist, both the Akaike Information (AIC) and the Schwarz 
Bayesian (BIC) Criteria are used to select the optimal lag structure of first differenced regression. (Pesaran 
et al., 2001) determined the upper and lower critical bounds to conclude that either cointegration for long-
run relationship exists or not among the running variables. The test has null hypotheses of no cointegration. 
The calculated F-statistics have been compared with the lower critical bound (LCB) and upper critical bound 
(UCB) computed by Pesaran et al. (2001), generated by the system automatically to test cointegration as 
follows:           F−statistic > UCB => cointegration exists; 
     F−statistic < LCB => no cointegration exists; 
LCB < F−statistics < UCB => inconclusive results. 
The direction of causal relationship between terrorism, economic growth and other macroeconomic variables 
in the study has been determined by means of a standard pair-wise Granger causality test. According to 
Granger representation theorem if the variables are integrated of order I(1) and cointegration exists among 
the variables then at least unidirectional Granger causality should exist.  
 
The ARDL analysis also estimates the coefficients of the long-run relations and makes inferences about their 
values. It must be highlighted though that it is only appropriate to embark on this stage if we are satisfied 
that the long-run relationship between the variables to be estimated is not in fact spurious. (Engle & Granger, 
1987) further elaborated that Granger causality can produce misleading results if cointegrated variables are 
tested at first difference through ARDL. However, the addition of another variable, error-correction term can 
help to capture the long-run relationships. Therefore, an error-correction term is included in the augmented 
version of Granger causality test and the result is a bivariate pth order error-correction model (ECM) which 
is as follows: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 =  𝛼01 + ∑ 𝛼11
𝑝
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𝑞
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𝑛=1
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Where the difference operator is indicated by Δ; lagged residual term generated from long-run equation is 
indicated by ECMt – 1 and μ is error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and a finite 
covariance matrix. The existence of a short-run causal relation is indicated by the significance of t-values of 
first differenced variables and the significance of t-values relating to error-correction term confirms a long-
run causal relationship. 
However, the main limitation of ARDL tests is the inability to indicate how much feedback has existed from 
one variable to another. To examine the feedback from one variable to another and to check the relative 
effectiveness of causality effects ahead of sample period, we have applied variance decomposition and 
impulse response function to examine the direction of causality amongst terrorism, economic growth, trade, 
education spending, military spending and unemployment.  
 
Section 5: Empirical results & discussion 
  
5.1 Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
Table 1 details the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix. The correlation analysis indicates a negative 
correlation between terrorism and the variables of military expenditure and trade whereas a positive 
correlation is found between terrorism and the variables of GDP growth and education, which seems counter 
intuitive and needs further investigation.  
Table 1: Summary results of descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 LTERROR LGDPPC LTRADE LEDU 
LMILITAR
Y LUNEMP 
 Observation
s  45  45  45  45  45  45 
 Mean  5.034433  10.53755  0.718058  2.281744  5.416282  4.486667 
 Median  6.059100  10.61400  0.357200  2.221800  5.621200  4.300000 
 Maximum  9.064500  10.96640  3.263100  3.022300  8.700000  7.800000 
 Minimum  0.000000  10.06090  0.022700  1.578300  3.265200  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  2.854146  0.283503  0.868894  0.367590  1.451157  1.821288 
 Skewness -0.515488 -0.247555  1.494623  0.036188  0.022848  0.030748 
 Kurtosis  1.965765  1.817673  4.215444  2.144607  1.904379  2.378285 
 Jarque-Bera  3.998535  3.080684  19.52418  1.381755  2.254637  0.731834 
 Probability  0.135434  0.214308  0.000058  0.501136  0.323901  0.693560 
 LEDU LGDPPC 
LMILITAR
Y LTERROR LTRADE LUNEMP 
LEDU  1.000000      
LGDPPC  0.470290  1.000000     
LMILITAR
Y  0.057729 -0.589919  1.000000    
LTERROR  0.570648  0.935379 -0.451454  1.000000   
LTRADE -0.582171 -0.889717  0.398942 -0.865621  1.000000  
LUNEMP  0.183064  0.638400 -0.436474  0.549466 -0.640555  1.000000 
 
5.2 Tests for Stationarity 
We begin our empirical testing by determining the stationarity of the variables used9. In order to proceed 
with the testing of ARDL cointegration later, ideally, our variables should be I(1), such that in their original 
level form, they are non-stationary and in their first differenced form, they are stationary. In the case where 
variables are integrated at I(2), calculated F-statistic cannot be used to determine the long-run relationship. 
The differenced form for each variable used is created by taking the difference of their log forms except 
when the variables are already in percentages as described in data and methodology section (Section 3). We 
then conducted the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and PP tests on each variable (in both level and 
differenced form) 10. Table 2 and 3 below summarize the results11.  
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for ADF test for unit root 
AT LEVEL 
L
E
V
E
L
 
F
O
R
M
 
VARIABLE ADF 
VALUE 
T-
STAT. C.V. 
RESULT 
                                                          
9 A variable is stationary when its mean, variance and covariance are constant over time. 
10 We tested for stationarity using the KPSS criteria as well and all variables to be I(0). See Appendix 3C for detailed results.  
11 See Appendix 1A to 1P for details. 
 
  
LTERROR 
ADF(2)=AIC -57.7561 -2.1505 -3.4399 Non-Stationary 
ADF(2)=SBC -61.9150 -2.1505 -3.4399 Non-Stationary 
LGDPPC 
ADF(3)=AIC 100.3106 -2.2125 -3.5818 Non-Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC 97.7608 -1.9704 -3.4873 Non-Stationary 
LTRADE 
ADF(5)=AIC -58.1536 -4.7454 -3.6057 Stationary 
ADF(5)=SBC -51.4993 -4.7454 -3.6057 Stationary 
LEDU 
ADF(2)=AIC -1.4528 -3.2454 -3.4399 Non-Stationary 
ADF(2)=SBC -2.7061 -3.2454 -3.4399 Non-Stationary 
LMILITARY 
ADF(5)=AIC -19.4649 -1.4153 -3.6057 Non-Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC -25.7183 -1.7441 -3.4873 Non-Stationary 
LUNEMP 
ADF(1)=AIC -45.6023 -2.4326 -3.4873 Non-Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC -48.9294 -2.4326 -3.4873 Non-Stationary 
 
AT FIRST DIFFERENCE 
D
IF
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
 F
O
R
M
 
VARIABLE ADF 
VALUE 
T-
STAT. C.V. 
Inference 
DTERROR 
ADF(1)=AIC -57.3269 -7.9410 -2.8607 Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC -59.7833 -7.9410 -2.8607 Stationary 
DGDPPC 
ADF(1)=AIC 96.5863 -3.0760 -2.8607 Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC 94.1299 -3.0760 -2.8607 Stationary 
DTRADE 
ADF(1)=AIC 48.3258 -5.8832 -2.8607 Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC 45.8695 -5.8832 -2.8607 Stationary 
DEDU 
ADF(5)=AIC  -0.67842 -4.4653 -2.8450 Stationary  
ADF(1)=SBC  -4.6006 -3.6475 -2.8607 Stationary  
DMILITARY 
ADF(4)=AIC  -19.5714 -3.4857 -2.8449 Stationary  
ADF(1)=SBC  -22.2483 -4.6017 -2.8607 Stationary 
DUNEMP 
ADF(1)=AIC -46.5409 -5.1023 -2.8607 Stationary 
ADF(1)=SBC -48.9973 -5.1023 -2.8607 Stationary 
Table 3: Summary statistics for PP test for unit root 
AT LEVEL 
L
E
V
E
L
 F
O
R
M
 VARIABLE T-STAT. C.V. RESULT 
LTERROR -3.5882 -3.4692 Stationary 
LGDPPC -1.7815 -3.4692 Non-Stationary 
LTRADE -1.3713 -3.4692 Non-Stationary 
LEDU -1.8789 -3.4692 Non-Stationary 
LMILITARY -4.6876 -3.4692 Stationary 
LUNEMP -2.3451 -3.4692 Non-Stationary 
 AT FIRST DIFFERENCE  
F
IR
S
T
 
D
IF
F
E
R
E
N
C
E
 VARIABLE T-STAT. C.V. RESULT 
DTERROR -10.5683 -2.9248 Stationary 
DGDPPC -5.2376 -2.9248 Stationary 
DTRADE -7.3958 -2.9248 Stationary 
DEDU -6.5178 -2.9248 Stationary 
DMILITARY -11.9740 -2.9248 Stationary 
DUNEMP -7.9257 -2.9248 Stationary 
 
  
Relying primarily on the AIC and SBC criteria, the conclusion that can be drawn from the above results is 
that all the variables we are using for this analysis are I(1)12, except for LTRADE which is stationary at 
level form and thus gives us the rationale to proceed with testing of cointegration using ARDL (not Granger 
cointegration causality approach).  
 
5.3 Determination of order of the VAR model 
 
Before proceeding with the test of cointegration, we first need to determine the order of the Vector Auto 
Regression (VAR), i.e. the number of lags to be used. As per the table below, results show that AIC 
recommends order of four whereas SBC favors zero lag13 (see Appendix 3A for details). 
Table: Optimal Lag Length 
Selection criteria 
Optimal Lag Order 
AIC SBC 
4 0 
Given this apparent conflict between recommendation of AIC and SBC, we address this in the following 
manner: (Pesaran & Smith, 1998) argue that the SBC should be given priority because it tends to define more 
parsimonious specifications whereas AIC gives relatively smaller standard error and thus estimates results 
with more precision. However, considering the trade-off of lower and higher orders, and realizing that all the 
observations in our study are annual we decide to choose the maximum lag order of 2 following (Pesaran et 
al., 1999). 
 
5.4 Testing for Cointegration 
Once we have established that the variables are I(1) and determined the optimal VAR order as 2, we are 
ready to test for cointegration.  
 
Table 4: Summary results of critical bounds values 
Level of Significance: Lower Bound Value Upper Bound Value 
5% 3.0077 4.2531 
10% 2.4818 3.6527 
 
Table 5: Summary results of ARDL cointegration test 
  Dependent Variables F-stats Optimal lag 
order 
Inference 
Confidence Interval: 95% 90% 
F(LTERROR|LGDPPC, LTRADE, LEDU, 
LMILITARY, LUNEMP) 
2.0777 (2,0,0,2,0,1) No 
Cointegration 
Inconclusive 
F(LGDPPC|LTERROR, LTRADE, LEDU, 
LMILITARY, LUNEMP) 
2.2642 (1,1,2,2,1,1) No 
Cointegration 
No 
Cointegration 
F(LTRADE|LGDPPC, LTERROR, LEDU, 
LMILITARY, LUNEMP) 
12.1359 (2,0,2,2,1,0) Cointegration Cointegration 
F (LEDU|LGDPPC, LTRADE, LTERROR, 
LMILITARY,LUNEMP) 
3.1226 (1,2,0,0,1,0) Inconclusive Inconclusive 
F(LMILITARY|LGDPPC, LTRADE, LEDU, 
LTERROR, LUNEMP) 
6.5231 (2,0,0,2,0,0) Cointegration Cointegration 
                                                          
12 The null hypothesis for the ADF test is that the variable is non-stationary. In all cases of the variable in level form, the test 
statistic is lower than the critical value and hence we cannot reject the null. Conversely, in all cases of the variable in differenced 
form, the test statistic is higher than the critical value and thus we can reject the null and conclude that the variable is stationary 
(in its differenced form). 
13 Based on highest computed values for AIC and SBC, after stipulating an arbitrary relatively high VAR order of 4. 
  
F (LUNEMP|LGDPPC, LTRADE, LEDU, 
LMILITARY,LTERROR) 
0.95677 (1,0,2,0,2,0) No 
Cointegration 
No 
Cointegration 
 
 
Table 6: Summary statistics of diagnostics tests for ARDL bound testing 
 
LTERRO
R 
LGDPP
C LEDU 
LTRAD
E 
LMILIT
ARY 
LUNE
MP 
R2 92.271% 99.781% 72.675% 98.311% 88.039% 87.327% 
LR test for serial 
correlation 
0.010089 
(0.921) 
0.30372 
(0.586) 
0.10866 
(0.744) 
0.50020 
(0.485) 
0.30754 
(0.583) 
0.00188 
(0.989) 
Ramsey’s RESET test 
for Function form 
0.3919 
(0.533) 
0.72221 
(0.403) 
0.13102 
(0.720) 
51.1877* 
(0.000) 
1.8586 
(0.182) 
0.42969 
(0.517) 
Heteroscedasticity 
0.83085 
(0.367) 
0.035143 
(0.953) 
1.6297 
(0.209) 
26.9799* 
(0.000) 
1.5453 
(0.221) 
0.17952 
(0.674) 
* F-Statistics statistically significant (P-values are within the parenthesis) 
The calculated F-statistics for military spending and trade are greater than the upper critical bounds generated 
by (Pesaran et al., 2001) at 1% and 5% levels of significance when terrorism, GDPPC, education spending 
and unemployment are treated as dependent variables. Our analysis indicates that there are two cointegrating 
vectors which validate the existence of a long-run relationship between economic growth, terrorism, trade, 
education, military spending and unemployment in the case of Pakistan for the period of 1970–2014. 
 
At the 5% significance level, diagnostic tests do not exhibit the violation of the classical linear regression 
model (CLRM) assumptions except for the model with trade as dependent variable, in which case we cannot 
accept null of no heteroscedasticity and functional form. Though heteroscedasticity may not be as such an 
issue in a time series macro variable, however, functional form misspecification (Ramsey RESET Test) could 
suggest that this variable is not linearly correlated or there is serial correlation in any of the models. The 
model can be further investigated through a model stability test as discussed in the next sections. At the same 
level of significance, there is no violation of no serial autocorrelation assumption in any in any of the series 
which indicates that all series are integrated at I(1). The coefficients of determination (R2) for each of these 
model is 92.27%, 99.78%, 72.68%, 98.31%, 88.04% and 87.32% respectively which are reasonably high and 
confirm that the models are efficient in explaining the dependent variables. 
 
We also tested the model with the Johansen multivariate approach to cointegration for robustness of long-
run relationships. The findings show that there are at least two cointegration vectors between economic 
growth, terrorism, education spending, military spending and total trade in the case of Pakistan for the period 
of 1970–2014, which confirms the robustness of the long-run relation (Table 7).  
Table 7: Summary results of test of cointegration LR test: 
Maximal Eigenvalue of Stochastic Matrix Trace test of Stochastic Matrix 
Null Alternative Statistic 5% CV Null Alternative Statistic 5% CV 
R  =  0 R = 1 79.4205 43.6100 R  =  0 R >= 1 187.2669 115.8500 
R <= 
1 
R = 2 34.5278 37.8600 R <= 1 R >= 2 107.8463 87.1700 
R <= 
2 
R = 3 30.8077 31.7900 R <= 2 R >= 3 73.3185 63.0000 
R <= 
3 
R = 5 12.1349 19.2200 R <= 3 R >= 5 42.5108 42.3400 
R <= 
5 
R = 6 7.0409 12.3900 R <= 4 R >= 5 19.1758 25.7700 
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at thee 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
5.5 Pair-wise Granger causality among macroeconomic indicators and terrorism: 
The next step is to investigate the direction of causality between economic growth, terrorism, trade, education 
spending, military spending and unemployment after finding evidence of cointegration. The pair-wise 
Granger causality approach is applied to ascertain the direction of causality between variables. The results 
of the Granger causality test are reported in Table 8. 
 
The results of pair-wise granger causality test indicate that GDP Granger causes both terror and 
unemployment. Also, the results indicate that Terror and military Granger cause trade, whereas, trade 
Granger cause GDP.  However, according to our analysis there is no causal relationship between 
unemployment and terror which is contrary to our expectation and needs further analysis. Recently (Nasir et 
al., 2008) investigated the direction of causal relationship between economic growth and terrorism and found 
no causality running either from economic growth to terrorism or from terrorism to economic growth. 
Moreover, the results also indicate no pair-wise direct causal relationship between military and education 
spending, however, there is a causal relationship from education to unemployment. The overall results of 
pair-wise causality are mixed and do not provide sufficient evidence to accept or reject the trade-off 
hypothesis of military spending at the cost of education spending and ‘deprivation hypothesis’ being the 
major cause of terrorism. Here we should acknowledge the limitation of Granger causality test as it may not 
necessarily be a true causality. If both X and Y are driven by a common third process with different lags, one 
might still fail to reject the alternative hypothesis of Granger causality. Therefore, to ascertain the 
cointegration amongst variables we proceed to the ARDL bounds testing approach. 
Table 8: Summary results of Pairwise Granger Causality Tests14 
 Null Hypothesis:  F-Statistic Prob.  
      LTERROR does not Granger Cause 
LGDPPC    0.19980 0.8197 
 LGDPPC does not Granger Cause LTERROR  8.02683*** 0.0012 
     MILITARY does not Granger Cause 
LGDPPC    0.07711 0.9259 
 LGDPPC does not Granger Cause MILITARY  1.87350 0.1675 
     EDU does not Granger Cause LGDPPC    1.52983 0.2296 
 LGDPPC does not Granger Cause EDU  0.12666 0.8814 
     TRADE does not Granger Cause 
LGDPPC    4.20316** 0.0224 
 LGDPPC does not Granger Cause TRADE  0.40627 0.6690 
     UNEMP does not Granger Cause 
LGDPPC    1.03829 0.3639 
 LGDPPC does not Granger Cause UNEMP  3.42190** 0.0430 
     MILITARY does not Granger Cause 
LTERROR    0.46758** 0.0251 
 LTERROR does not Granger Cause MILITARY  0.62665 0.5398 
     EDU does not Granger Cause LTERROR    1.47633 0.2413 
 LTERROR does not Granger Cause EDU  0.00581 0.9942 
     LTERROR does not Granger Cause 
TRADE     3.43343** 0.0426 
TRADE does not Granger Cause LTERROR          0.91394 
                 
0.4096 
    
                                                          
14 Retrieved results from EVIEWS 9.0. See Appendices section. 
  
 UNEMP does not Granger Cause 
LTERROR    0.55581 0.5782 
 LTERROR does not Granger Cause UNEMP  1.56148 0.2230 
     EDU does not Granger Cause 
MILITARY    0.29350 0.7473 
 MILITARY does not Granger Cause EDU  0.35386 0.7043 
     TRADE does not Granger Cause 
MILITARY    0.53088 0.5924 
 MILITARY does not Granger Cause TRADE  3.22257** 0.0510 
     UNEMP does not Granger Cause 
MILITARY    2.50362 0.0952 
 MILITARY does not Granger Cause UNEMP  0.32513 0.7244 
     TRADE does not Granger Cause EDU    0.45086 0.6404 
 EDU does not Granger Cause TRADE  0.02836 0.9721 
     UNEMP does not Granger Cause EDU    0.34383 0.7112 
 EDU does not Granger Cause UNEMP  0.02273* 0.0975 
     UNEMP does not Granger Cause 
TRADE    0.02314 0.9771 
 TRADE does not Granger Cause UNEMP  1.37492 0.2652 
        Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at thee 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
NOTE: To ascertain the direction of causality between macroeconomic indicators we applied the VECM 
granger causality approach towards cointegration. However, the results stemming from this approach, with 
positive VECM terms and greater than unity coefficients, were not in-line with theoretical rational and are 
thus not reported here. For reference sake these results are included in the Appendices section of the report. 
 
5.6 Short-run and Long-run relationship between macroeconomic indicators: 
So far we have established that there exist two cointegrating relationships amongst these variables, however, 
we have not determined that which variables are exogenous (leading) and which behave as endogenous 
(followers). Thus, we proceed with the ARDL approach, which not only provides us the information about 
independent and dependent variables but also indicates their short-run and long-run relative elasticities. 
However, as we are using macroeconomic variables, thus, we are more interested in the respective long run 
elasticities of the variables. The estimated results of ARDL cointergration tests for equations 1 to 12 as 
discussed in methodology section are presented in table 9 and 10. Lag orders have been selected through 
Akiake Information Criterion (AIC) for estimating ARDL model as AIC emphases on predicting best of the 
order of lags. This selection criterion, contrary to SBC, focuses on large value of likelihood and less 
concerned on over-parameter. 
 
The statistical significance of lagged Error Correction Term i.e. ECMt − 1 in table 9 indicates long-run Granger 
causality while the significance of t-statistics of the lagged explanatory variables show the short-run causal 
relationships amid the variables. The ECM term also provides us the verdict about leading and following 
indicators. A statistically significant ECM term of a dependent variable in the model indicates the 
endogeneity of the variable; whereas a non-significant term designates that variable as exogenous. At least 
one of the ECMt − 1 terms should be significant for the validity of the cointegrating relationship among the 
variables in the long term. Also, the coefficient of ECM term measures the speed of adjustment of each 
endogenous variable towards the equilibrium.  
The estimated results of our model suggest that military spending is the only exogenous (independent) 
variable with all other variables being endogenous. The results partially coincide with are a priori expectation 
that there is an opportunity cost associated to the military expenditure as spending on military puts a drag on 
the government budget to be allocated towards more instrumental variables for an economy such as 
  
education, unemployment and trade. Due to lack of education and unemployment, the probability of 
unemployed people indulging into terrorist activities increases and ultimately stagnates economic growth.   
  Table 9: Summary of results for short-run elasticities 
Dependent 
Variables 
Short-run relationship 
Coefficient value (p-value) 
ARDL 
Model 
∆𝐥𝐧 𝑻𝑬𝑹𝑹𝑶𝑹𝒕 ∆𝐥𝐧 𝑮𝑫𝑷𝑷𝑪𝒕 ∆𝐥𝐧 𝑻𝑹𝑨𝑫𝑬𝒕 ∆𝐥𝐧 𝑬𝑫𝑼𝒕 ∆𝐥𝐧 𝑴𝑰𝑳𝑰𝑻𝑨𝑹𝒀𝒕 ∆𝐥𝐧 𝑼𝑵𝑬𝑴𝑷𝒕 
(2,0,0,2,0,1
) 
(1,1,2,2,1,1) (2,0,2,2,1,0) 
(1,2,0,0,1,0
) 
(2,0,0,2,0,0) 
(1,0,2,0,2,0
) 
∆ln 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅𝑡 - 
0.001309 
(0.650) 
-0.0033325 
(0.881) 
-0.0089616 
(0.820) 
0.059960 
(0.541) 
0.062843 
(0.615) 
∆ln 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑅1𝑡 
0.42054 
(0.015)** 
- - 
0.060806 
(0.101) 
- - 
∆ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑡 
13.1834 
(0.000)*** 
- 
-2.8124** 
(0.036) 
1.6461** 
(0.021) 
0.31192 
(0.834) 
-4.2755 
(0.528) 
∆ln 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶1𝑡 - - 
-2.2748*** 
(0.045) 
- - 
-15.1056** 
(0.015) 
∆ln 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸𝑡 
0.04032*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.05118*** 
(0.013) 
0.42016*** 
(0.003) 
-0.051487 
(0.616) 
3.0586*** 
(0.000) 
-2.5240** 
(0.016) 
∆ln 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸1𝑡 - 
0.048416**
* 
(0.008) 
-  
-1.4436)*** 
(0.029) 
- 
∆ln 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝑡 
-0.1951 
(0.782) 
0.001769 
(0.890) 
-0.035466 
(0.721) 
- 
-0.33928 
(0.393) 
-0.77584 
(0.134) 
∆ln 𝐸𝐷𝑈1𝑡 - 
0.042546**
* 
(0.002) 
0.2290** 
(0.040) 
 - 
1.0576 
(0.075)* 
∆ln 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑌𝑡 
0.27923 
(0.105) 
0.0031369 
(0.488) 
0.13811*** 
(0.000) 
0.033143 
(0.428) 
- 
0.018238 
(0.880) 
∆ln 𝑀𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑅𝑌1𝑡 - - - - 
-0.28101** 
(0.031) 
- 
 
∆ln 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃𝑡 
0.19902 
(0.351) 
-0.0050469 
(0.182) 
-0.031516 
(0.198) 
-0.055118 
(0.143) 
-0.12132 
(0.248) 
- 
∆ln 𝑈𝑁𝐸𝑀𝑃1𝑡  - -  - - - 
𝑬𝑪𝑴𝒕−𝟏 
Long Run 
Relationship 
-1.2976*** 
(0.000) 
-2.9874*** 
(0.005) 
-0.28210*** 
(0.000) 
-
0.39439*** 
(0.008) 
0.080544 
(0.525) 
-
0.38093*** 
(0.007) 
Inference 
Endogenou
s 
Endogenous Endogenous 
Endogenou
s 
Exogenous 
Endogenou
s 
Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at thee 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
The results in table 9 highlight that in the short run, statistically significant variables are GDP growth, trade 
and military spending. In the short run, trade and GDP growth are the explaining variables for terrorism. 
GDP growth depends on education and trade whereas education and unemployment significantly explained 
by GDP growth and trade in the short run, suggesting a two way causality between education and GDP 
growth. However, long run analysis in table 10 elicits a significant relationship of terrorism with military 
spending and education. One might expect a negative relationship between terrorism and military spending 
i.e. more military spending will ultimately curtail terrorism, however, contrary to expectation, terrorism is 
positively and significantly related to military spending in Pakistan. It might be surprising given trillions of 
  
US dollar worth military spending over the course of 14 years of ‘war on terror’ but the most plausible 
inference is that a military response on its own could at best be a short term deterrent against terrorism. 
 
  Table 10: Summary of results for long-run elasticities: 
Dependent 
Variables 
Long-run relationship 
Coefficient value (p-value) 
ARDL 
Model 
LTERROR LGDPPC LTRADE LEDU 
LMILITAR
Y 
LUNEMP 
(2,0,0,2,0,1) (1,1,2,2,1,1) (2,0,2,2,1,0) 
(1,2,0,0,1,0
) 
(2,0,0,2,0,0) 
(1,0,2,0,2,0
) 
LTERROR - 
0.042776** 
(0.038) 
-0.011813 
(0.880) 
-0.27257 
(0.199) 
0.74444 
(0.638) 
0.16498 
(0.633) 
LGDPPC 
10.1595*** 
(0.000) 
- 
-1.3811 
(0.178) 
4.1737 
(0.104) 
3.8726 
(0.864) 
-1.1468 
(0.801) 
LTRADE 
0.031072 
(0.928) 
-0.2236*** 
(0.014) 
- 
-0.13055 
(0.600) 
5.8454 
(0.605) 
-2.5018** 
(0.028) 
LEDU 
1.0582* 
(0.064) 
-0.20891 
(0.109) 
-0.60157 
(0.105) 
- 
-4.2123 
(0.664) 
-3.6718** 
(0.020) 
LMILITAR
Y 
0.21518* 
(0.078) 
-0.021543 
(0.341) 
-0.060489 
(0.508) 
0.27143* 
(0.067) 
- 
0.047878 
(0.881) 
LUNEMP 
-0.12354 
(0.402) 
0.001632 
(0.948) 
-0.11172 
(0.166) 
-0.13975 
(0.119) 
-1.5062 
(0.575) 
- 
INPT 
-
105.1785**
* 
(0.000) 
11.2171*** 
(0.000) 
17.8054* 
(0.090) 
-41.1342 
(0.123) 
-25.7660 
(0.908) 
26.8285 
(0.588) 
F-Stat (Joint 
Significance)  
5.2308*** 
(0.000) 
4.4676*** 
(0.001) 
9.6515*** 
(0.000) 
3.1709*** 
(0.011) 
14.6298*** 
(0.000) 
2.3820** 
(0.037) 
      Note: The asterisks ***, ** and * denote the significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Another interesting result of our study is a positive relationship between GDP growth and incidence of 
terrorism in the long run. The rise in per capita income (economic growth) contributes to terrorism. 
Apparently, counter-intuitive, the main reason for this might be the unequal distribution of income after 
economic growth, resulting in acute economic disparity within different factions of the society, benefiting a 
chosen few at the expense of an overwhelming majority of the population, leading to a high sense of 
deprivation which then translates into increased terrorism in Pakistan. This result is also consistent with the 
‘modernization theory’ according to which unequal growth may lead to a situation where a country is being 
worse off than before the growth had actually happened as economic disparity may fuel social and political 
unrest. The studies performed by (Lai & Thyne, 2007), (Freytag & Thurik, 2010), (Caruso & Schneider, 
2011) and (Ismail & Amjad, 2014) revealed similar results. 
 
The results also corroborate that GDP growth depends on trade in the long run. The causal relationship 
between GDP growth, trade and terrorism can thus be explained that a rise in terrorism impacts international 
capital and trade flows by lowering foreign direct investment, lowering domestic output and an increased 
capital outflow (Shahbaz et al., 2013). This leads to a decreased share of the country’s exports in international 
markets and decreased GDP. This stimulates further increase in unemployment which in turn increases 
terrorist activities. Another conforming outcome of our results is the long term dependency of education 
spending on the military spending which resonates with our earlier ‘trade-off hypothesis’ that the government 
has to cut the education budget in order to cater the terrorist risk and invest more on defense and military 
  
expenditures. The results that unemployment in the long run is dependent upon trade, GDP growth and 
education also substantiates our earlier results and corroborates the discussed theoretical underpinnings. The 
coefficients of ECT of all the endogenous variables are normal; i.e. have negative signs and range between -
1 and 0. The statistically significant F-statistics of each model indicates the overall validity of the results and 
are presented at the bottom line of table 10. 
 
5.7 Stability tests 
We then tested the ‘stability’ of the coefficients of the equations with the help of CUSUM and CUSUMSQ 
tests and we find that the coefficients are all stable since they are all within the 5% critical bounds. Only 
CUMSQR tests results are reported here (Figure 3) and CUSUM tests results are reported in the appendices 
section. 
Figure 3: Plot of Cumulative Sum of Recursive Residuals 
 
[LTERROR]         [LGDPPC] 
 
[LEDU]        [LTRADE] 
 
[LMILITARY]        [LUNEMP] 
 
5.8 Variance Decomposition of Forecast Errors (VDC) 
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1972 1983 1994 2005 2014
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1972 1983 1994 2005 2014
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1972 1983 1994 2005 2014
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1972 1983 1994 2005 2014
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1972 1983 1994 2005 2014
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1972 1983 1994 2005 2014
The straight lines represent critical bounds at 5% significance level
Plot of Cumulative Sum of Squares of Recursive Residuals
  
The VDC decomposes the variance of the forecast error of a particular variable into proportions attributable 
to shocks (or innovations) in each variable in the system including its own.  
 
Table 11: Summary results of generalized VDC 
 Variables 
LTERR
OR 
LGDP
PC 
LTRA
DE 
LED
U 
LUNE
MP 
LMILITA
RY 
TOT
AL 
SEL
F-
DEP 
RANKI
NG 
1-YEAR HORIZON 
LTERRO
R 
79% 8% 4% 6% 3% 
1% 
100% 79% 
4 
LGDPPC 3% 81% 9% 3% 3% 0% 100% 81% 3 
LEDU 0% 10% 56% 0% 30% 4% 100% 56% 6 
LTRADE 1% 2% 1% 81% 4% 11% 100% 81% 2 
LUNEMP 2% 5% 32% 0% 59% 3% 100% 59% 5 
LMILITA
RY 
2% 5% 1% 2% 2% 
88% 
100% 
88% 1 
3-YEAR HORIZON 
LTERRO
R 
61% 16% 1% 8% 1% 
13% 100% 61% 4 
LGDPPC 5% 68% 15% 4% 7% 1% 100% 68% 1 
LEDU 1% 17% 53% 0% 19% 9% 100% 53% 6 
LTRADE 5% 4% 2% 66% 7% 16% 100% 66% 3 
LUNEMP 5% 4% 28% 1% 53% 9% 100% 53% 5 
LMILITA
RY 
2% 8% 4% 17% 2% 
67% 100% 67% 2 
5-YEAR HORIZON 
LTERRO
R 
56% 22% 3% 7% 1% 
12% 
100% 56% 
3 
LGDPPC 5% 51% 22% 7% 11% 4% 100% 51% 4 
LEDU 4% 18% 50% 1% 17% 9% 100% 50% 5 
LTRADE 6% 6% 2% 62% 9% 16% 100% 62% 2 
LUNEMP 4% 4% 25% 2% 48% 16% 100% 48% 6 
LMILITA
RY 
3% 7% 4% 18% 2% 
65% 
100% 
65% 1 
10-YEAR HORIZON 
LTERRO
R 
47% 25% 9% 7% 3% 
10% 
100% 47% 
3 
LGDPPC 5% 36% 29% 8% 13% 10% 100% 36% 6 
LEDU 7% 24% 46% 2% 14% 8% 100% 46% 4 
LTRADE 6% 7% 2% 59% 8% 18% 100% 59% 2 
LUNEMP 4% 4% 24% 4% 43% 21% 100% 43% 5 
LMILITA
RY 
4% 8% 5% 18% 2% 
63% 
100% 
63% 1 
 
The relative exogeneity/endogeneity of a variable can be determined by the proportion of the variance 
explained by its own past shocks. Thus the variable which is explained mostly by its own shocks (and not by 
others) is deemed to be the most exogenous of all. The source of this forecast error is the variation in the 
current and future values of the innovations to each endogenous variable in the VAR. There are two sorts of 
VDC analysis; Orthogonal and Generalized. Orthogonalized VDC depends on the particular ordering of the 
  
variables in the VAR, and also assumes that when a particular variable is shocked, all other variables in the 
system are switched off. That is why, the rank of exogeniety obtained from orthogonalized VDC changes 
dramatically if you alter the ordering of the variables in the VAR. For example, the first period decomposition 
for the first variable in the VAR ordering is completely due to its own innovation. Therefore, we use 
Generalized VDC for our analysis as it does not employ such assumptions (Pesaran & Shin, 1998). The 
results drawn from orthogonalized VDCs are still reported in the appendices section of the report. 
 
According to the reported statistics in the above table, in case of a one-year time horizon, the most exogenous 
variable is the military spending and the most endogenous variable is the education spending. The results are 
intuitive on the ground that due to a trade-off between military and education spending, government has to 
have given priority to the defense sector over education within its limited budget constraints and to prevent 
terrorism. Although, the results suggest some variations in the relative ranking of exogeneity within different 
time horizons, we can observe some consistencies as well. For example, in almost all other time horizons, 
education and unemployment are ranked as the most endogenous and thus most influenced by the military 
spending and trade being the most exogenous or self-dependent. However, the relative exogeneity of GDP 
per capita exhibit a changing trend throughout being the most exogenous in 3 year horizon with 68% self-
dependency to rank 6 with 36% exogeneity over a ten year horizon. This changing trend in GDP suggests 
that in the long run GDP growth depends more on other variables like military spending, trade and terrorism.   
 
5.9 Impulse Responses (IR) Function 
The information contained in the VDCs can be equivalently represented by IRFs.  Both are obtained from 
the MA (residuals) representation of the original VAR model. IRFs essentially map out the dynamic 
response path of a variable owing to a one-period standard deviation shock to another variable. The graphs 
of IR are presented in figure 4. 
 
   
 
Figure 4: Plot of generalized impulse response for each dependent variable  
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From the above graphs we can observe that military spending, education spending and GDP growth are the 
most influential variables in explaining terrorism. The shock in education spending also brings about a lot of 
variation in unemployment. However, a shock in terrorism does not bring about much variations in the 
economic variables, which is somewhat against the economic rationale. However, a possible explanation 
could be that in the aftermath of Pakistan’s participation in the ‘war against terror’, the generous economic 
aid and debt rescheduling by the international community has rescued the country and the impact of terrorism 
has not dampened the economic growth in a way it could have had otherwise done. 
 
 
 
Section 6: Caveats / Limitations of study and future directions for research 
1. As already mentioned, the results obtained from VECM Granger Causality Approach were showing 
anomalous results with high positive error correction terms. The possible reasons could either be the 
presence of serial autocorrelation because of using more parsimonious lag order selection or it could 
be the presence of structural breaks within the time series data. This research can be extended by 
introducing dummy variables for any structural breaks.  
2. Pakistan is a developing country in which the institutions of political representation have not 
developed substantially and the army remains a powerful political force. Thus, an important 
macroeconomic variable of Political Instability can be incorporated to extend the scope of study to a 
higher level and increase its cross-discipline appeal. 
3. Also, one of the caveats of ARDL bound testing for establishing long run relationships is that ARDL 
model is a single equation model that does not remain consistent in presence of simultaneous 
equations. Therefore, in future research more advanced and better econometric models can be 
deployed for a more robust and technically correct estimation. 
 
Section 7: Conclusion & policy implications 
Terrorist attacks can have significant negative effects on economic performance but measuring such impact 
with a higher degree of certainty is inherently challenging. In addition, while there is a wide range of factors 
which give rise to terrorism, economic factors also play a role. With the help of the ARDL bounds testing 
approach followed by variance decomposition (VDC) and impulse response (IR) analyses, this study 
provides empirical investigation of the economic causes of terrorism in Pakistan and suggests certain 
effective counterterrorism policies. 
 
Pakistan is a poor and insecure state that has sustained itself throughout the years with external support 
against perceived existential threats emanating from its immediate neighborhood. Poverty, illiteracy, 
population explosion, lack of democratic culture and an increasing sense of deprivation and insecurity 
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amongst the masses are important glitches and must be effectively dealt with irrespective of the incidence or 
absence of terrorism. Rather than securing the vital socio-economic interests of literacy, employment and 
internal harmony of the country, the state has been busy fighting a spillover of terrorism from Afghanistan 
along with an enduring quest for security amidst a hostile and hegemonistic India. This has collectively over 
the years lead to a quagmire of terrorism and internal instability. 
The main objective of this paper was to determine any causal relationship amongst the variables of economic 
growth, military expenditure, education expenditure, unemployment rate and trade on the onslaught of 
terrorism in Pakistan. The results of the overall study clearly conform to the ‘deprivation hypothesis’ that 
underdevelopment and poverty in Pakistan have provided fertile grounds to terrorists for new recruits. The 
ARDL bound testing results suggest that military spending is the only exogenous variable in determining 
terrorism in Pakistan. This implies that gradual reduction in military spending relative to education budget 
could be used as policy instrument as military expenditure significantly influences education spending, which 
in turn is directly linked to unemployment, GDP growth and trade and, thus, either hinders or leads towards 
terrorism.  
 
According to our analysis, in the short run terrorism in Pakistan is most affected by its overall trade and GDP 
growth while in the long run terrorism elicits a significant relationship with military spending and education. 
One might expect a negative relationship between terrorism and military spending i.e. more military spending 
will ultimately curtail terrorism, however, contrary to expectation, terrorism is positively and significantly 
related to military spending in Pakistan. It might be surprising given trillions of US dollar worth military 
spending over the course of 14 years of ‘war on terror’ but the most plausible inference is that a military 
response on its own could at best be a short term deterrent against terrorism. This coupled with the fact that 
97.4% of all terrorist incidents in the past decade were in under developing countries and over 80 per cent of 
the lives lost to terrorist activity in recent years occurred in ﬁve developing countries - Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, Nigeria and Syria – highlights that no military expenditure will bear fruit unless a specific 
development threshold has been achieved as is in several western countries. Indeed, among the five countries 
accounting for the bulk of terrorist attacks, the U.S. has prosecuted lengthy ground wars in two (Iraq and 
Afghanistan), a drone campaign in one (Pakistan), and airstrikes in a fourth (Syria) but even with the military 
might of the US, nothing seems to check the exponential growth of terrorist activities. We believe that 
spending more and more on military involvement in the name of ‘war against terror’ would only make matters 
worse. So, the most important resolution to help the host country against terrorism can probably be political 
and economic, not military. The slogans of ‘Trade not Aid’ and ‘Cooperation is Education’ are probably 
better and workable counter-terrorism policy narratives in the long run for a developing country like Pakistan.  
 
Another interesting result of our study is a positive relationship between GDP growth and incidence of 
terrorism in the long run i.e. the rise in per capita income (economic growth) contributes to terrorism. 
Apparently, counter-intuitive, the main reason for this might be the unequal distribution of income after 
economic growth, resulting in acute economic disparity within different factions of the society, benefiting a 
chosen few at the expense of an overwhelming majority of the population, leading to a high sense of 
deprivation, which then translates into increased terrorism in Pakistan. This result is also consistent with the 
‘modernization theory’ according to which unequal growth may lead to a situation where a country is being 
worse off than before the growth had actually happened as economic disparity may fuel social and political 
unrest. The studies performed by (Lai & Thyne, 2007), (Freytag & Thurik, 2010), (Caruso & Schneider, 
2011) and (Ismail & Amjad, 2014) revealed similar results. 
 
An added objective of the study was to establish the relative endogeneity and exogeneity of these 
macroeconomic variables and terrorism i.e. what variables actually need to be influenced to achieve the 
desired counter-terrorism results. As eluded to earlier, military spending is the most instrumental in impacting 
  
most dependent variables of education, unemployment etc. Another important implication out of the Impulse 
Response Analysis in the study is that one standard deviation shock in terrorism has least effect on all of the 
macroeconomic variables. A possible explanation could be that in the aftermath of Pakistan’s participation 
in the ‘war against terror’, the generous economic aid and debt rescheduling by the international community 
has rescued the country and the impact of terrorism has not dampened the economic growth in a way it could 
have had otherwise done. 
However, we cannot ignore the fact that the effects of terrorism are transmitted to economic growth through 
various channels. It is only a stable economic system which can develop the desired immunity to face the 
challenges of domestic terrorism and security issues internal to the country. Short term counter-terrorism and 
policing strategies can often be critical to prevent the potential of large and unexpected acts of mass violence; 
however, longer term approaches are essential. These longer term priorities include the need to address the 
issues of unemployment, education, poverty, inequality and improving access to justice and rule of law.  
 
Summarily, terrorism has adversely affected Pakistan’s development and imposed heavy economic burden 
by indirectly steering the state focus away from socio-economic development to mere security concerns. The 
general loss of confidence in the economy and the consequent inability to attract foreign inflows, coupled 
with high military expenditure and poor educational and trade infrastructure lead to economic distortions 
impacting economic growth and causing instability. However, effective action to combat terrorism must take 
cognizance of both the ‘deprivation hypothesis’ as well as the ‘modernization hypothesis’. Where on one 
side increased economic growth through better education, balanced trade and attenuated military expenditure 
would take away the incentive for the impoverished to join the ranks of terrorists, an uneven growth is equally 
likely to reinvigorate the spiral of intolerance, violence and terrorism in the country. There is a dire need to 
strike a cautious balance between hard military power and development sectors of the economy in order to 
ensure a fair and equitable distribution of resources that is beneficial as well as sustainable.   
 
Our analysis should give policymakers at least some rough clues about what is at stake economically in the 
wake of a severe terrorism wave in Pakistan. Furthermore, at a broader level, perhaps the best way to nip 
terrorism in the bud is pursuing policies which are conducive for balanced economic growth. Our 
econometric analysis of Pakistan indicates that a strong economy is a powerful antidote to terrorism. Better 
military and civilian intelligence will also help, as will effective poverty eradication programs that render a 
stable Pakistan less susceptible to the ideological propaganda of extremist groups. To conclude, while 
terrorism in Pakistan is a multidimensional issue, we hope that our analysis can contribute toward a better 
and richer understanding of its causes and device policies. 
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